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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CHARLES N. BENNETT, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
-vs-
DONNA MAE BENNETT, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
PETITION' FOR REHEARING 
CASE NO. 16268 
The Defendant-Respondent, DONNA MAE BENNETT, hereafter 
referred to as the RESPONDENT, hereby petitions this Honorable 
Court for a rehearing of the judgment rendered on February 20, 
1980, wherein this Court set aside its October 19, 1979, per 
curiam decision sustaining the Lower Court property settlement, 
reversed the judgment of the Lower Court and remanded for 
proceedings concerning property distribution between the parties. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON REHEARING 
The Respondent seeks reversal of the decision of the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah as the same is contained in 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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the decision rendered February 20, 1980, and to have the 
decision of the Utah Supreme Court of October 19, 1979, re-
instated. In the alternative, Respondent prays for either 
an evidentiary hearing before the said Utah Supreme Court 
in its exercise of equitable jurisdiction or that the matter 
be remanded to the Lower District Court for a full hearing on 
the new evidence contained in Exhibit "A" of this brief. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS PERSUADED THAT THE ONLY 
ASSET OF THE MARRIAGE THAT WAS AVAILABLE 
FOR IMMEDIATE SALE AND DIVISION BETWEEN THE 
PARTIES AT THE TIME OF TRIAL WAS THE FAMILY 
DWELLING. THE COURT'S REFUSAL TO CONSIDER 
THE $15,682.00 PAYROLL· DEDUCTIONS AS AN 
ASSET IN THE POSSESSION OF THE APPELLANT 
ONLY IF HE WITHDRAWS THEM AT LEAST ONE 
MONTH PRIOR TO RETIREMENT AS AN ASSET 
AVAILABLE AT TIME OF TRIAL FOR DISTRIBUTION 
· WAS · NOT • ERROR. ( EMPHASIS SUPPLIED.) THE 
ORIGINAL DECISION OF THIS HONORABLE COURT'S 
SUSTAINING THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD SHOULD 
BE REINSTATED. 
It is agreed by all concerned that the only way 
Appellant could make the cash value of his contributions 
available for either himself or to be divided between the 
parties on October 25, 1978, would be to withdraw the 
$15,682.00 he has paid in by payroll deduction prior to 
-2-
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April 7, 1984, or one month before becoming eligible to 
retire. 
All parties, counsel, witness and the trial court 
agree that to make the Appellant's paid-in contributions 
immediately available for distribution would totally destroy 
Appellant's 37-year retirement. 
What is not agreed and the basis for this appeal is 
the fact that in making a division of marital assets,- ·~ · 
trial court refused to cons:ider 'either :the Appellant•·s: ·$15(6-8'2'.'0·0 
of contributions or the matching amount held· by ·the u.: s. Govern-
ment :as an asset available for immediate di·s:tribution. 
The request to have Appe,llant's cash contributions 
treated as one of two assets which the court should consider 
was made by Appellant's counsel (R-90, L's 19-30 and R-91, L's 1-2). 
MR. VLAHOS: "Maybe I'm missing something, Your 
Honor, but that's not the way I heard the testimony from 
anybody in that regard. 
"My understanding is that ·the· other mon:ey; was put 
into retirement fund and he could not touch it, had 
no control over it, and it went to his heirs, (referring 
to the Government matching account) or towards his 
annuity. And that's the way I understood Mrs. Woods' 
testimony. 
fication). 
(Material in brackets inserted for clari-
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"If you are talking about equities, Your Honor, I 
would suggest to the Court that 38,000 net equity, plus 
15,682, (Appellant's paid-in contributions) comes out 
$53,682. Divide that by two, is 26,841. ·Subtract: from 
tha't p?rti<>n lS,6:8:2·, which my client 'has:· in: his: ·poss~s:ston, 
leaving a claim of ll,159. And if the Court is taking 
that position, then I think that would be equity." 
(Emphasis supplied). 
clarification). 
(Material in brackets added for 
The trial court rejected the claim of Plaintiff's counsel 
that the $15,682.00 of Plaintiff's contributions was money that 
Appellant then had in his possession. The Lower Court was 
eminently correct in considering only the $38,000.00 estimated 
equity in the family dwelling as immediately available for dis-
tribution. The court made the following observations (R-89, 
L's 24-27): 
THE COURT: "Thirty-eight thousand is the net equity 
in the home. Divide that between the two of you, that's 
$19,000.00 each. And deduct from that the retirement, 
$15,682.00, that's $3,318.00. That's the difference 
there." 
That the $15,682.00 paid into the Civil Service Retire-
ment System by Appellant had a dollar value of $15,682.00 is 
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irrefutable. That the money was not at that time, and is not 
today, in the Appellant's possession is also indisputable not 
withstanding the errorneous claims of Appellant's counsel. 
It is also an absolute that Appellant had, and has to-
day and will have until one month prior to May 1, 1984, the 
right to make the $15,682.00 of his paid-in contributions 
available for immediate distribution. The right to exercise 
control over his personal contributions is an incident of 
ownership which had at trial, and has today, a present value. 
The right to direct to heirs or to receive as an annuity 
the $15,682.00 held by the Federal Government in a retirement 
fund which Appellant has never seen and has no control over is 
also an incident of ownership which Appellant has and had at 
time of trial. If such ownership had been considered by the 
court in the same light as the Appellant's paid-in contributions, 
the following property award would have resulted: 
Equity in home 
Appellant's retirement contributions 
U. s. Government matching fund 
available only as death or annuity 
TOTAL property to be divided 
$69,364.00 divided by 2 equals 
-s-
$38,000.00 
lS,682.00 
· · ·l:s,·6,e:z.·oo 
$69,364.00 
: ::;>3:4,:6:S:2.:QQ 
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Respondent's award (all the home) 
(R-92, L-5) 
Less Appellant's lien of $5,000.00 
TOTAL to Respondent 
$38, ooo. oo 
· · ·-:5: ,·o·O'o- .·oo 
: :s:3:3 ,:Q:O:O:.:Q 0 
Had the trial court believed the errorneous claim made 
by Appellant's counsel that the Appellant had his paid-in contri-
butions of $15,682.00 in his possession (R-90, L's 29-30) and 
thus available for immediate division between the parties, the 
following division would have been proper: 
l. A lien to Appellant for $19,000.00 on family resi-
dance. 
2. Equity award to Respondent $19,000.00, family 
residence. 
3. Cash award to Respondent $7, 891. 00 from Appellant's 
retirement contributions. 
4. Appellant's retirement $7,891.00 on deposit in his 
retirement account. 
TOTAL equity to each party 
TOTAL cash to each party 
GRAND TOTAL cash and lien to 
each party 
$19,000.00 
$ 7,891.00 
$26, 891. 00 
The problem is that to consider both the equity in the 
family dwelling and the cash value of the Appellant's contri-
butions equally available for immediate distribution would 
-6-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
destroy at least half, if not all, of the value of the Appel-
lant's 37 years of Federal Civil Service unless he were to be 
ordered to borrow $7,891.00 from other sources to pay to 
Respondent in lieu of withdrawing half of his retirement 
contributions. 
Working within the limitations of the assets and the 
facts before it, the trial court chose to preserve both the 
family dwelling and the full value of Appellant's Federal 
retirement without imposing the hardship of additional debt 
on the Appellant, and that determination should be reinstated 
and sustained by this Honorable Court. 
The confusion is apparently caused by the attempt by 
Appellant to persuade the trial court that Appellant should be 
awarded one-half of the equity in the parties' home together 
with one-half the cash value of his contributions to the 
Federal Civil Service retirement and then be allowed to with-
draw the entire cash value of his contributions to retirement 
again beginning May 7, 1984. Appellant does not object to 
having his cash contributions included in the property settle-
ment even though, as argued orally by his counsel before this 
court, Appellant has never seen them, if those contributions 
are counted once on October 25, 1978, for 50% of their value 
and again on May 7, 1984, for 100% of their value. The fact 
-7-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
is that should Appellant die before May 7, 1984, or retire 
(R-76, L's 1-3) on that date, his paid-in contributions would 
be counted one and a half times and the value of the u. s. 
Government account would also go to someone other than his 
wife of 37 years had the trial court done equity by the 
definition offered by Appellant's counsel at pages 90 and 91 
of the trial record. 
At issue is the question of how should the trial court 
value an asset for which Appellant paid 5% to 7% of his salary 
and which had a cash value on October 25, 1978, of $15,682.00 
but which Appellant does not have in his possession and can 
only possess by destroying something of even greater value in 
expectancy? 
The latitude historically afforded trial courts in 
dealing with complicated matters of this kind is broad enough 
to sustain the decision of the Lower Court in this case. 
POINT II 
THE RETIREMENT OFFICER IN THE CIVILIAN PERSONNEL 
OFFICE AT HILL AIR FORCE BASE, MARGARET S. WOODS, 
WAS CALLED AS RESPONDENT'S WITNESS IN THE TRIAL. 
THE WITNESS VOLUNTEERED STATEMENTS BEYOND HER 
COMPETENCE. THE TRIAL JUDGE OBSERVED HER DEMEANOR 
AND ASSESSED THE VALUE TO BE ATTACHED TO THE 
VARIOUS PARTS OF HER TESTIMONY INCLUDING THAT 
HAVING TO DO WITH THE PRESENT VALUE OF APPELLANT'S 
FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE RETIREMENT. 
-a-
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Margaret s. Woods, though called as Respondent's witness, 
volunteered much information to favor Appellant even when she 
lacked specific knowledge of the facts at issue. Mrs. Woods' 
actions came as a surprise to Respondent and her counsel, but 
were correctly weighed by the trial judge. At page 73, line 11 
of the trial record, we find: 
Q "Now, can you tell us what the present grade 
and step of Charles Bennett is?" 
A "I can, sir ... 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
* * * 
"What is his annual salary before exemptions 
and deductions?" 
"Effective October 5th of '78 -- effective 
October 5th, it wou'ld be $18,254.00. But I 
must say one thing, sir." 
"Go ahead." 
"Tn behal'f of Mr.: Bennett( r•m :su.re :that 
Mr.• Bennett was •not ·aware of• :his• new ·urorease, 
because we had no pUblicity on Hill Field, be-
cause the President signed it at a late date. 
And Mr. Bennett, the employee -- copies have 
not been distributed to the employees as of 
today. " (Emphasis supplied. ) 
"You are essentially saying, as of today he 
had no official notification of the changes?" 
Again at page 77, line 15: 
A "Mr. Bennett would not be authorized to re-
tire until age fifty-five, which would be 
May 7th of 1984, would be th~ ea;liest pos-
sible date that he could retire. 
-9-
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Q "What would be those monthly benefits on 
that date?" 
* * * 
THE COURT : "She may answer. " 
A "Well, .based .. on .. his .current salaryr· ·of 
courses which· could-either go u~, orhe 
could.a h1t i:n "RIF and it coulA o down, 
speculating, e wou d receive out .1 70 
per month, less his health insurance, if 
he stayed with. Alliance. That's currently 
about $28.00 per month. Of course, that's 
subject to change. So his take-home, about 
1042 per month." (Emphasis supplied.) 
The willingness of the witness to offer gratuitous 
testimony favorable to Appellant was correctly assessed by the 
trial judge who was in a position to observe her demeanor and 
to give the proper weight to her evidence. This Honorable 
Court should reinstate its prior decision sustaining the trial 
court's division of marital assets. 
POINT III 
THE QUESTION OF THE PRESENT VALUE OF THE 
APPELLANT'S $1,042.00 PER MONTH OF FEDERAL 
CIVIL SERVICE RETIREMENT WHERE THE FIRST 
PAYMENT IS DEFERRED TO MAY 7, 1984, SHOULD 
NOT BE DECIDED ON THE CONTRADICTORY AND DE-
MONSTRABLY BIASED TESTIMONY OF RESPONDENT'S 
WITNESS. UNBIASED EXEERT TESTIMONY IS 
AVAILABLE (SEE EXHIBIT "A") AND WOULD HAVE 
BEEN CALLED AT TRIAL HAD THERE BEEN ANY IN-
DICATION FROM PRIOR INTERVIEWS OF THE BIAS 
OF MARGARET WOODS. WHILE NOT APPARENT FROM 
-10-
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THE MERE WRITTEN RECORD THE BIAS WAS AP-
PARENT TO THE TRIAL JUDGE. 
Respondent's witness, Margaret Woods, testified some-
what reluctantly that Appellant would receive the sum of 
$1,042.00 per month beginning at age fifty-five on May 7, 1984. 
(R-77). Exhibit "A" attached to this brief states that the 
value of that monthly benefit measured as of the date of trial 
was $75,821.00. Appellant, as of October 25, 1978, had contri-
buted a mere $15,681.00 to that present value. If only the 
contributions of Appellant are taken into account in making 
division of the marital assets in this case, Appellant will, in 
effect, take for $15,681.00 what any other person would have had 
to pay $75,821.00 for on October 25, 1978. 
The present value of Appellant's benefit of $75,821.00 
is made more certain than that of a non-governmental employee 
because it is based on the power of the Federal Government to 
levy current taxes. On the other hand, the investment of the 
$75,821.00 by a private individual would be subject to the in-
vestment uncertainties of private pension funds. 
Even if the funds needed to generate a monthly income 
of $1,042.00 with the first payment not due until age fifty-five, 
or six years hence, could be invested at a guaranteed long-term 
rate equal to the rate today for six-month money market certi-
-11-
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ficates, i.e., 13%, it would still require $41,507.00 invested 
as of October 25, 1978, to provide the $1,042.00 ~er month 
income which Appellant will receive from his Federal Civil service 
retirement at age fifty-five. (Exhibit "A"l. 
The practical certainty that Appellant will begin 
drawing $1,042.00 per month six years hence, at age fifty-five, 
is illustrated by the present value of Appellant's $1,200.00 per 
month, age 65, retirement benefit at 8%. It is $28,902.00, and 
at 13% a mere $10,693.00 or some $5,000.00 less than his 
October 25, 1978, contributions. (Exhibit "A"). 
The trial court properly took into account the present 
value of Appellant's retirement benefits and exercised proper 
discretion in awarding Appellant $5,000.00 as a lien on the 
parties' only other asset, the family residence, the lien being 
awarded for other than economic reasons. Respondent's share of 
$33,000.00, while not equal to Appellant's in dollar value, 
recognizes basic emotional and family needs, and should be 
affirmed by this Honorable Court. 
POINT IV 
THE QUESTION OF WHEN THE PRESENT VALUE OF ANY 
EXPECTANCY OR PROMISED BENEFIT IS ENCOMPASSED 
BY THE LANGUAGE OF ENGLERT V. · ENGLERT, (19 7 8) 
UTAH 576 FZd 1274, 1276 MAY BE A MATTER TO BE 
DETERMINED ON A CASE BY CASE BASIS. IN THE 
-12-
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CASE AT BAR, THE POSSESSORY INTEREST OF THE 
APPELLANT IN HIS RETIREMENT IS AS ABSOLUTE 
AS IS THE PARTIES' POSSESSORY INTEREST IN THE 
$38,000.00 EQUITY WHICH ONE APPRAISER ESTI-
MATED TO BE IN THE FAMILY RESIDENCE. 
The present value of Appellant's $1,200.00 per month 
retirement benefit at age 65 is $28,902.00, whereas a lessor 
monthly benefit of $1,042.00 taken 10 years sooner has a value 
today of $75,821.00 or nearly three times more. Retirement at 
age fifty-five with 37 years of Federal service is for all 
practical purposes certain. (Exhibit "A"). 
When a current money market, six-month interest rate is 
used and retirement is deferred to age 65, the present value of 
Appellant's $1,200.00 per month retirement benefit shrinks to a 
mere $10,693.82 or $5,000.00 less than the amount paid in by 
Appellant as of October 25, 1978. (Exhibit "A"). 
The Appellant's retirement benefits are totally in his 
control and discretion; and were this an estate or inheritance 
tax case revolving around a private annuity, the Appellant would, 
as a matter of law, be said to have a taxable possessory present 
interest in the entire $75,821.00 present value. When the 
Appellant, in the future exercise of his unfettered discretion, 
begins to receive a monthly retirement check in excess of 
$1,000.00 per month while the Respondent must look forward to 
-13-
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10 more years of daily labor, the question of whether Appellant 
possessed the present value of the amount necessary to purchase 
his retirement benefit on October 25, 1978, will be as academic 
as the question of whether or not the parties possessed the 
estimated equity in the family residence on the same date. 
If one can possess the promise of the Federal Government 
to pay the face value of its bonds, treasury bills, or other 
evidences of Governmental obligation, then it is respectfully 
urged that Appellant possesses, in the case at Bar, the present 
value of his Federal Civil Service retirement. 
The Employees Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 
makes the 100% vesting of non-Governmental retirement benefits 
mandatory under the facts here present no matter which vesting 
schedule is applied. In a future case, will such 100% vested 
benefits which the employee has the total right to withdraw 
both as to his and his employers contributions be fully part of 
a marital property division while only the personal contributions 
of a Governmental employee may be considered without error? 
What of an employee covered by a completely non-
contributory retirement plan into which he has personally paid 
nothing but has a 100% vested benefit which he may elect to 
receive the day after the trial court following the February 
20th decision in the case at Bar finds he has no possessory 
-14-
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interest and does not include in the division of marital 
property? Suppose the monthly benefit to be the same $1,042.00 
and the hypothetical husband or wife to be fifty-five years of. 
age with 37 years of service as in the instant case. 
On the issue of whether the Appellant's monthly retire-
ment in six years from the trial date is property possessed by 
the parties, such a value, which has been determined to be 
$75,821.00, is no less in possession of the parties than the 
"estimate of value" of the parties' dwelling which gives rise 
after subtracting the mortgage debt to the alleged equity of 
$38,000.00. 
According to Ballentine's Law Dictionary, Third Edition, 
at page 85, "To appraise" is to "estimate value." As applied 
here, it is what the parties' home might have sold for had it 
been put on the market at the time the appraisal was given. 
It appears from the trial record that there were as 
many different estimates of value of the parties' dwelling as 
there were appraisers. (R-S, L's 1-15). 
Counsel urges that the present value of Appellant's 
monthly retirement benefit of $1,042.00 is a certain figure of 
$75, 821. oo; and regardless of how many enrolled actuaries apply 
the 8% investment figure and the 1971 group annuity male 
mortality table, it will always be the same. 
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If the parties possess the estimated equity in their 
dwelling, they must possess the mathematical certainty of the 
present value of Appellant's monthly retirement benefits and 
not just what Appellant has contributed. 
Stated another way, if the parties have any greater 
value in the marital dwelling than the $12,500.00 principal 
for which it was purchased. (R-34), so, surely, do they possess 
the greater value of Appellant's retirement than the $15,681.00 
which Appellant had contributed as of the trial date. (R-80). 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted to this Honorable Court 
that the question of the present value of Appellant's retire-
ment is a matter of $75,821.00 as valued in today's dollars, 
and Respondent is entitled to have a rehearing with an 
opportunity to argue the issues of possession, life expectancy, 
assured rates of investment return, and the use of the 1971 
group annuity, male mortality table to this Honorable Court in 
the exercise of its equitable jurisdiction~ or, in the alterna-
tive, to have a full evidentiary hearing on the issues of present 
value and possession at the ~rial court level. 
Respectfully submitted, 
/ _I_. , 
J .- Val Rober'ts - - - - · -.o' 
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent 
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c;c.1cra1th & Green, Inc. 
Mr. J. Val Roberts 
Attorney at Law 
43 East 500 South 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Dear Mr. Roberts: 
EXHIBIT "A" 
March 3, 1980 
Per your request, we have calculated the actuarial present value of benefits 
for a 49 year old male as of October 25, 1978. In making our calculations, 
we have relied upon the retirement benefits that were contained in your 
letter to our firm dated March 3, 1980. 
Based upon this data the present value of benefits are as follows: 
Retirement 
Age 
55 
65 
Monthly 
Benefit 
$1,042.00 
$1,200.00 
Present Value 
8% 13% 
$75,821.00 
$28,902.92 
$41,507.48 
$10,693.82 
Our calculations have been made using the 1971 Group Annuity male mortality 
table, at both 8% and 13% compounded annual interest rates. 
wn 
Sincerely, 
5 c.,,..V C ! L l cc_ .• -,_.__ 
Scott C. Morgan 
Assistant Actuary 
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CERTIFrCATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed on thi~ ··//)#</day of 
fla!)&j\... · · , 1980, TWO true and correct copies of the 
above and foregoing Respondent's Brief, by posting same in 
the U. s. mails, postage prepaid and addressed to the 
following counsel of record, to-wit: 
Pete N •. Vlahos, Esq. 
Vlahos, Knowlton & Perkins 
Legal Forum Building 
2447 Kiesel Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
(Attorney for Appellant) 
£.fjJ,''~ ;j~RfTAR~ 
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